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RETHINKING THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: LEGAL TENDER AND 
NATIONAL BANKING IN THE  
CIVIL WAR ERA 
Michael T. Caires* 
Charles Beard had an undeniable flare for rethinking 
American History. These collected essays mark the anniversary 
of Beard’s path-breaking, and now infamous, An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution. Yet Beard, along with his wife 
Mary Ritter Beard, used that same view of the history of 
American politics and society to re-think, not just the founding, 
but the entire sweep of American history in their influential 
survey The Rise of American Civilization, published in 1927. One 
standout chapter of that book is their interpretation of the 
American Civil War. In “The Second American Revolution,” the 
Beards argued that the real significance of the Civil War was not 
found in the war itself, but in the economic transformation of the 
North. This thesis has had a long life among scholars, and while 
portions of the Beardian story have been refuted, it is safe to say 
that the larger perspective offered by the Beards remains at the 
bedrock of how many historians view the overarching narrative 
and significance of the Civil War.1 
My purpose in this essay is to provide a brief overview of the 
Beardian view of the Civil War and its current place in the 
historiography. I will then suggest some ways that the Beardian 
story fails us and our perspective on the history of American 
political economy during the war by discussing the origins of the 
Legal Tender Act and the National Banking Act in the Civil War 
 * Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Bankard Fund in Political Economy, 2012–13, University 
of Virginia. 
 1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: THE INDUSTRIAL ERA 52–121 (1927). See generally Philip 
Shaw Paludan, What Did the Winners Win?: The Social and Economic History of the North 
during the Civil War, in WRITING THE CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND 174 
(James M. McPherson & William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., 1998). 
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Era. In short, what I would like to suggest is that these policies 
grew out of the failure of the antebellum monetary system and 
represented an effort to control and regulate the contours of 
American capitalism. 
I. BEARD’S CIVIL WAR 
The Beardian perspective has the benefit of being 
refreshingly simple and straightforward. People’s material 
interests motivate their actions. A strong sub-theme of Beard’s 
interpretation of American history is a constant story of what 
political scientists now term “capture.” The forces of capital and 
industry use their power to hijack public institutions and realign 
them to create a political economy conducive to their interests. In 
his Economic Interpretation, there is a clear sense of class 
divisions as the capitalists and merchants unite to wrest control 
over the country’s economic future from the more popular 
agrarian class. Applying the idea to the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Beards saw class as subsumed in region. They argued that 
southern secession allowed the forces of industry in the North to 
capture the federal government from the hands of the southern 
planter class, and with the capture began the ascendance of what 
they dubbed “the industrial age” in American history.2 
It’s still a shocking thesis to read from the perspective of 21st 
century historiography. With sweeping prose, the Beards 
dismissed all the images of the war that their readers were 
accustomed to. The battles and generals were only a romantic 
gloss to the real substance of change that Beard found: 
[T]he core of the vortex lay elsewhere. It was in the flowing 
substance of things limned by statistical reports on finance, 
commerce, capital, industry, railways, and agriculture, by 
provisions of constitutional law, and by the pages of statute 
books—prosaic muniments which show that the so-called civil 
war was in reality a Second American Revolution and in a strict 
sense, the First.3 
The Beards even hedged the significance of emancipation in 
the light of the ascendance of this new power. To the progressives, 
it provided an origin point for understanding exactly how business 
 2. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 53–54; William 
J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO 
LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014). 
 3. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 54.  
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captured the federal government in the Gilded Age. Many other 
authors prior to World War II picked up the Beardian view of the 
war and fleshed out the narrative to include Reconstruction.4 
The thesis underwent an intense examination over the course 
of the 1960s. The Beards emphasized that the real revolution 
could be found in the economic indicators of the northern 
economy, yet they did no real economic analysis to support this 
point. Thomas Cochran and Stanley Engerman famously refuted 
the notion that there was an economic take-off during the Civil 
War years. Their economic research concluded that the war 
actually had the opposite effect on GDP and industrial output, 
and most likely slowed the pace of industrial growth. Moreover, 
Robert P. Sharkey and Irwin Unger disassembled the idea that 
there was a united north during Reconstruction on the greenback 
issue. Iron producers in Pennsylvania clashed with northeast 
financial elites over the questions of contraction, resumption of 
specie payments, and by extension the economic future of the 
country.5 
Yet, it cannot be denied that while the specifics of the Beard 
thesis have lost their luster, the thrust of their argument—that an 
industrial North trumped the agricultural South—seems to 
remain in place. James McPherson’s widely read survey of the 
Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, endorsed this view.6 Richard 
Franklin Bensel’s 1990 Yankee Leviathan remains the central 
work on how and why the federal government became stronger in 
the war years, and largely rests on the Beardian view.7 
To be sure, Bensel refined and brought up to date the 
Beardian Civil War with careful attention to the nature of state 
development in the mid-nineteenth century. Explicitly using the 
capture perspective and comparing the U.S. to other states, 
Bensel posited that the Civil War allowed the Republican party 
to capture the U.S. government and use it as a tool for their 
developmental policies. Prior to 1860, the stagnation of national 
 4. Paludan, supra note 1, at 174–89; ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND 
PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 3–14 (1967). 
 5. SHARKEY, supra note 4; IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879 (1964); Thomas Cochran, Did 
the Civil War Retard Industrialization?, 48 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 197 (1961); Stanley 
L. Engerman, The Economic Impact of the Civil War, 3 EXPLORATIONS 
ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 176 (1966). 
 6. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 452 
(1988). 
 7. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF 
CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990).  
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authority was a result of southern leaders who kept the central 
state weak to prevent its interference with the institution of 
slavery. Bensel avoided the Beards’ oversimplifications by adding 
the wrinkle that the state helped create class. In short, he 
suggested that the national debt created a new class of financial 
elites, who then used their power over national policy to cut short 
the reconstruction of the South, foreshadowing a state that would 
use its powers to the advantage of capital over that of agriculture 
and labor.8 
There has never been a better time to return to the “vortex” 
that the Beards described. The most recent and important 
contributions to the historiography of the Civil War have largely 
focused their attention away from the political economy of the 
North.9 Focusing on monetary legislation, I hope to provide a new 
perspective about the kind of federal state that the Union won 
during the Civil War. 
My research tries to understand civil war monetary policy 
within the context of its origins. With the Beards, greenbacks and 
national banking are simple products of war. Beard goes a bit 
farther by arguing that national banking was the pet-project of 
“business enterprise.”10 Moreover, we are left to believe that these 
policies were the ultimate victory for Hamiltonian and Whiggish 
thought, a thesis that stands to this day.11 Upon careful 
examination, neither the Legal Tender Act nor the National 
Banking System fully conforms to this narrative. Each of these 
laws interjected the federal government into the political 
economy of the United States in what were widely seen as novel 
and intrusive ways. The style and substance of this intrusion 
borrowed as much from Democratic thought as it did from the 
Whigs. In the end these policies were not the same kind of 
promotional policies as the Pacific Railway Act, the Homestead 
Act, or tariff policy. Ultimately the growth of national monetary 
power was an effort to reform and stabilize the chaotic currency 
system of the nineteenth century. 
 8. Id. at 10–17, 68–69, 238–302. 
 9. See the discussion of present and future trends in the special roundtable on the 
future of Civil War studies in 2 J. CIV. WAR ERA 3–10 (2012). 
 10. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 108. 
 11. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 6, at 450.  
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II. AMERICAN MONEY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 
The place to start is not with what the Beards termed “the 
industrial vortex of the Northeast,” but the Wildcat Banks of the 
Midwest. In 1861, the banking system of Illinois imploded, taking 
with it many of the banks of the Midwest. A banking collapse, 
then and now, usually meant a freeze on credit and a slowing of 
commerce. The immediate effects of this collapse created a more 
immediate problem. It wiped out the monetary system of the 
entire region. That was only possible because the monetary 
system of mid-nineteenth century America depended on a species 
of currency that we would not recognize as money today.12 
Gold was technically the only legal money of the United 
States in 1861. Contractual debts for money could only be 
satisfied with gold and silver coin minted by the U.S. government. 
Yet the scarcity of coin in the United States led most Americans 
to depend on notes issued by hundreds of banks across the 
country. Since before the War of 1812, banks served as the 
primary money manufacturers and regulators of the monetary 
system, with state governments providing various levels of 
oversight. Once chartered, an individual bank would aggregate 
coin and issue notes based on these reserves. The face of each note 
promised that the holder could present the note at the window of 
the cashier and get the par value in coin. With the belief that the 
note was as good as gold, it could pass from hand to hand and 
function as the circulating medium of a given community or 
region. That was the ideal situation; in reality, there was little to 
stop banks from issuing paper in excess of their reserves. Such 
notes did circulate, but at a discount depending on the reputation 
of the bank. The multiplicity of notes also lent itself to rampant 
counterfeiting. Thus mid-nineteenth century Americans had to 
navigate a world of money where one was constantly trying to 
evaluate and judge the value of the paper in their pocket. It is 
from our 21st century perspective a complex, confusing system, 
capable of providing cheap credit, but always on the edge of 
another collapse, as it was in the Panics of 1819, 1837, and 1857.13 
 12. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 4; EMERSON 
DAVID FITE, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH DURING THE CIVIL 
WAR 110–11 (1930); BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS 
AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 37–38 (1970); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE 
GREATEST NATION OF THE EARTH: REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC POLICES DURING THE 
CIVIL WAR 67–68 (1997); STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: 
CAPITALISTS, CON MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES (2007). 
 13. Federal laws relating to legal tender came as sections to laws dealing with the 
regulation of the gold and silver currency. For example the act of 1853 revaluing the half- 
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A regulatory role for the federal government in the national 
monetary system was largely out of the question due to the legal 
and political history of the previous fifty years. Due to the 
framers’ anger over the various state-issued currencies of the 
Revolutionary era, and their shame and disgust over the 
depreciation of the Continentals issued by Congress during the 
War for Independence, the Constitution contained an odd 
constellation of monetary provisions. The unanimity of the 
framers on the powers of the states is reflected in Article I, Section 
10’s ban on state-issued paper money (known as bills of credit) 
and the restriction disallowing states from using gold and silver as 
a legal tender. A provision allowing for the federal government to 
issue bills of credit was also struck down during debate in 1787. 
On that point, however, some delegates believed that the U.S. 
could issue paper, as long as it was not a legal tender.14 
The Constitution, moreover, said nothing about banks. In 
1787 there were three banks in the United States. The few chance 
references to banking at the constitutional convention showed 
that the delegates were thinking about large national banks like 
the Bank of England or the Bank of North America. No one could 
predict the proliferation of small banks that issued money across 
the country in the decades after ratification. James Madison 
confessed many years later that the state banks were a “great evil” 
that were “not foreseen” at the time of the writing of the 
Constitution.15 When the banking system collapsed during the 
War of 1812, federal leaders and commentators saw the de-
centralized banking system as a weakness and the primary cause 
of panic. The problem in the way of meaningful reform was a 
strongly rooted belief in the constitutionality of state banks. 
State legislatures incorporated and regulated the banks, 
making banking and note-issue functions of state power. With the 
Constitution silent on the subject of currency created by state 
dollar, quarter, dime. and half-dime, declared that silver coins would be a legal tender for 
debts under five dollars. See Act of Feb. 21, 1853, ch. 79 (10 Stat. 160). See also Act of Apr. 
2, 1792, ch. 16, §16 (1 Stat. 250); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 10–11 (1957); David A. Martin, Bimetallism 
in the United States before 1850, 76 J. POL. ECON. 428 (1968); David A. Martin, U.S. Gold 
Production Prior to the California Gold Rush, 13 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 437 (1976); 
Edward J. Stevens, Composition of the Money Stock Prior to the Civil War, 3 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 84 (1971). 
 14. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 308–10 (Max Farrand, 
ed., 1911). 
 15. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (Feb. 1831), in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 463 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987), available 
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_10_1s22.html.  
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corporations, decades of custom and usage led to a widespread 
belief that the states had acquired a right to create banks that 
would produce paper money. An attack on that right would 
require a rethinking of American federalism that the 
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian generation refused to consider. The 
bitterest enemies of the banks, including President Andrew 
Jackson and Thomas Hart Benton, conceded that the state banks 
were out of federal reach. In 1836, Aaron Vanderpoel, a 
Democrat from New York, thought the intent against a fractured 
currency system was clear in the Constitution but noted that 
custom and usage had turned Article I, Section 10 into a “dead 
letter.”16 He explained, based on common law principles, 
the states had for more than forty years exercised the power of 
incorporating banks with power to issue notes; and if the 
original exercise of this power was founded in usurpation and 
error . . . it was, at all events, an error so old and so general as 
to have acquired the authority of right and law.17 
This belief in the constitutionality of the banks informed 
constitutional law. When Missouri tried to issue its own paper 
money (under the guise of state loan office certificates), Chief 
Justice John Marshall found it easy to strike these notes down as 
state bills of credit in Craig v. Missouri.18 When the question of 
state bank notes came directly before the Court in Briscoe v. Bank 
of Kentucky, a new Taney court majority held for the state’s right 
to create banks of issue.19 Yet it would be a mistake to view the 
issue of state banks as a product of Democratic versus Whig 
constitutional thought. Marshall had just passed away, and Justice 
Joseph Story said that he would have found against the Bank of 
Kentucky. But what was at issue was the degree to which the Bank 
of Kentucky was a direct organ of the Kentucky legislature. In this 
case the Commonwealth of Kentucky held the majority of shares 
of the bank, and state coffers paid its employees. In his dissent 
Story agreed with the majority that it was perfectly constitutional 
for states to create banks that issued notes based on a reserve of 
coin. 
The one viable option to regulate the welter of banks before 
the Civil War was indirect federal control. The Bank of the United 
States was not originally envisioned by Alexander Hamilton as a 
 16. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 2d sess., app. 51 (1836). 
 17. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 18. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410 (1830). 
 19. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S 257 (1837).  
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means of regulating the state banks. The bank grew into that role, 
especially the Second Bank of the United States. By the 1830s, the 
BUS developed a system of acquiring bank notes from all over the 
country and holding them in reserve. State banks would restrict 
their issues out of fear that the BUS could present all those notes 
for payment on the same day, thus forcing suspension. Critically, 
from the Hamiltonian-Whig point of view the bank was an 
attractive policy option because it worked with the market, as 
opposed to government-issued paper money that was subject to 
the whims of democracy. As explained by Hamilton, a legislature 
would always print paper in an emergency before it would raise 
taxes, and thus, “so certain of being abused, that the wisdom of 
government will be shown in never trusting itself with the use of 
so seducing and dangerous an expedient.”20 Nevertheless, the 
BUS succumbed to attacks by Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, and 
by the late 1840s even its admirers, such as a young Abraham 
Lincoln, confessed that another BUS was out of the question as a 
matter of politics.21 
Direct regulation was in the hands of the market and the 
states that chartered them. After 1837, coalitions of Democrats 
and Whigs passed legislation that regularized the chartering of 
banks and attempted to regulate note issue with reserve 
requirements monitored by new state banking departments. In 
the biggest financial centers, banks banded together into clearing 
house associations that helped stabilize their local systems by 
pooling funds to support weak member banks and regulating 
interbank payments. In practice this patchwork of reform worked 
imperfectly. Especially in the West, stories abounded of banks 
that duped regulators. In a few extreme cases, several western 
states banned banknotes all together. It was within this volatile 
market that the federal government expanded its reach during the 
Civil War.22 
 20. Alexander Hamilton, “Report on a National Bank,” 1 ANNALS OF CONG., app. 
2096 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 21. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: What General Taylor Ought to Say, in 1 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 454 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953). 
 22. LEONARD CLINTON HELDERMAN, NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS: A STUDY OF 
THEIR ORIGINS 101–32 (1931); WILLIAM G. SHADE, BANKS OR NO BANKS: THE MONEY 
ISSUE IN WESTERN POLITICS, 1832-1865 (1972); JAMES ROGERS SHARP, THE 
JACKSONIANS VERSUS THE BANKS: POLITICS IN THE STATES AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837 
(1970).  
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III. LEGAL TENDER 
The problem of the banks was not just a problem for business 
in peacetime; it was also a serious problem for the U.S. 
government in time of war and financial panic. Without a BUS, 
the federal government had no inflationary tools to help pay the 
cost of war. It was during the War of 1812 that the federal 
government began issuing its own paper money, called Treasury 
notes. The notes passed constitutional muster because most 
members of Congress could justify them as an act of borrowing. 
Each note promised a redemption date and was good for public 
dues owed to the U.S. While most Democrats favored gold, it was 
attractive during a time of emergency to use the people’s credit in 
the form of notes managed by the people’s representatives as 
opposed to trusting in state banks or a single BUS. Democratic-
dominated Congresses repeated and strengthened this tradition 
in the Panic of 1837, the Mexican American War, the Panic of 
1857, and as late as 1860 on the verge of the Civil War. The fact 
was that when the monetary system went into disarray during 
each of these financial or military emergencies, Jeffersonians and 
Jacksonians welcomed incursions by the government into the 
structure of the American political economy. 
The size and nature of the Civil War forced Congress to take 
this tradition one step further. In the winter of 1861 and 1862 the 
banks of New York City suspended specie payments, taking the 
U.S. government down with it. The decision to suspend was a 
combination of politics and economics. Secretary of the Treasury 
Salmon P. Chase embraced a policy of borrowing millions in coin 
from the bank to finance the Union war effort. When the hope of 
a quick Union victory dissipated in the fall of 1861, the capitalists 
became fearful that the U.S. would drain them of all their 
resources. When a delegation of bankers headed to Washington 
D.C. in early January to confer with the government, they were 
quite clear in their demands: they wanted the government to raise 
taxes and use bank credit as the primary means of paying for the 
war.23 
But the political mood of the country was against them. In 
the press, the bankers of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston 
were branded as traitors. In the House, Rep. Elbridge G. 
 23. HAMMOND, supra note 12 at 155–57; E.G. SPAULDING, A RESOURCE OF WAR—
THE CREDIT OF THE GOVERNMENT MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, 18–21; Gallatin 
on the Currency, BANKERS’ MAG. & STAT. REG., Feb. 1862, at 625; N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 6, 
1861, at 3; N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 13, 1862, at 4–5.  
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Spaulding took the lead in drafting a bill that would allow the 
government to issue 150 million in treasury notes that would be a 
legal tender. This would allow the government to meet its 
financial obligations with less dependency on the capital of the 
banks. Across the country, commentators embraced legal tender 
as a war measure shorn of any complicated financial logic.24 
Unlike the old Treasury notes, this bill rested on force and 
compulsion and would require the federal government to warp 
and break the rules of finance capitalism in a new way. Congress 
fretted over the implications of such an action. Under the old 
Treasury note regime, the government offered its paper in 
payment without forcing anyone to take them. In this way, 
Treasury notes conformed to what might be called the rules of 
finance capitalism in Europe and America. In both places, 
governments financed their wars by attracting investors with a 
reasonable return on their money. The legal tender notes sliced 
through this logic by compelling the government’s creditors, and 
creditors across the country, to take paper money with nothing 
behind it but the faith of the government. Moreover, inflation 
would affect prices in ways that no one could predict. As to its 
constitutionality, many congressmen took solace in the fact that 
the government has already been issuing paper money for some 
time. Legal tender, they reasoned, was merely an extension of this 
customary power. In the final analysis, most Republicans in 
Congress voted for the bill with grave doubts.25 The fact that the 
bill passed at all was a measure of their collective fear of an 
economic collapse and the destruction of the Union war effort 
from within. 
While legal tender paper money was born out of wartime 
necessity, the notes quickly became an attractive policy to replace 
the regime of state bank notes. During the debates over the Legal 
Tender Act, several congressmen hoped that this could be a viable 
permanent solution to the state bank note problem.26 Moreover, 
Americans across the country embraced what they called 
“greenbacks” as they became more accustomed to them during 
the Civil War. Petitions in the National Archives bear testament 
 24. Letter from J.C. Day to Sherman (Feb. 11, 1862), John Sherman papers, 1759-
1897, vol. 46, Library of Congress; Letter from R. Buchanan to Sherman (Feb. 11, 1862), 
John Sherman papers, 1759-1897, vol.46, Library of Congress; Letter from T.W. Olcott to 
E.G. Spaulding, (Jan. 31, 1862), in Spaulding, supra note 23, at 51. 
 25. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 679, 691, 766, 796, 800, app. 56; THE STATE, 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION (Richard Sylla, Richard Tilly, 
& Gabriel Tortella, eds., 1999). 
 26. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 688, 791, app., 57, 58.  
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to how westerners especially embraced the idea of full federal 
control of the monetary system by making greenbacks the legal 
tender of the country and, as one petition put it, “authoriz[ing] 
them to circulate among the people as a medium of exchange 
forever.”27 This idea would only grow in the later 1860s as groups 
of Republicans and Democrats in industrial and agricultural 
regions demanded inflation as a key to economic growth. 
IV. NATIONAL BANKING 
Legal tender, however, was not the only possible solution to 
the problems of the American monetary system. In December 
1861, Chase proposed to solve the problem of the monetary 
system by nationalizing the banks that created the money. Chase 
had seen the value of a national currency system as governor of 
Ohio in the aftermath of the Panic of 1857. Moreover, Chase’s 
concerns about fixing the American monetary system echoed a 
sizable amount of commentary after 1857 that increasingly looked 
to some sort of national currency to fix the banks. Post-1857, 
Chase and voices across the country argued for the existence of a 
national currency power that could be used to stop the banks.28 
Chase proposed a system that solved the problems of 
American finance by mixing Democratic ideology with a 
Whiggish concern for the national economy. The bill proposed 
that the government would charter banks that would then 
purchase U.S. securities that would be used to secure the issue of 
national bank notes. This was attractive for three reasons. First, it 
would not crush states’ rights. The National Banking System 
(NBS) would exist in tandem with the state systems. Chase hoped 
that a majority of banks would convert to the NBS because they 
saw it as financially attractive. Second, it obviated the need for a 
 27. “Petition of B.H. Smith and 41 other Citizens of Illinois…,” undated, “Petition 
of Andrew Siders and 49 other citizens of Illinois,” undated, file HR 37A-G20.2, RG 233, 
37th Congress, Records of the Ways and Means Committee, NARA. 
 28. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., app. 
23 (1861); SALMON P. CHASE, MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR OF OHIO TO THE FIFTY-
THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE REGULAR SESSION COMMENCING JANUARY 4, 1858 
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BANKERS MAG. & STAT. REG. 513 (1859); National Currency, 16 AM. WHIG REV. 424 
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single monster bank. Each bank would be rooted in its community 
and beholden to the people’s representatives in Congress and not 
the whims of a single BUS. Lastly, it was compatible with the gold 
standard. During the war national banks could redeem their notes 
in greenbacks, but with the resumption of specie payments, the 
NBS would serve as a reform to the old system.29 
The bill had weak support. Several historians have stressed 
that the bill passed because it would create a solid market for U.S. 
securities. The reality is that that Congress passed the first version 
of the National Banking Act in April 1863 because of inside 
baseball on the part of Chase. Chase was able to enact his vision 
by convincing President Abraham Lincoln, Senator John 
Sherman, and the Cooke brothers, Jay and Henry. This collective 
group pressured and cajoled enough in Congress to pass the act. 
In the Senate, the bill passed by a single vote.30 
The critical turning point occurred between 1864 and 1865. It 
is between those years that the last holdouts, the financiers of the 
east and various Republican legislators, embraced national 
authority over the currency. In 1864 Congress passed a second 
National Banking Act that changed several aspects of the system, 
including a pyramid reserve system that would empower New 
York City banks. This time the NBA passed with almost total 
Republican support.31 Former opponents, like Henry L. Dawes in 
the House, accepted the national banking plan as a necessary 
means “to cure an existing and acknowledged evil.”32 The reforms 
were an active ploy by Chase to attract the biggest New York 
banks to join the system, thus assuring the NBS’s success. More 
importantly, Republicans in Congress accepted the NBS as 
necessary to the country’s economic future. In 1865, Congress 
passed a 10% tax on the banknotes of state banks and finally 
destroyed the era of the Wildcats. With this, the NBS grew from 
467 banks in 1864 to 1,294 banks in 1865. When the state banks 
attempted to dismantle the system with a constitutional challenge, 
a majority of the Supreme Court, now with Chase as the Chief 
 29. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d sess., 882; CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Nov. 12, 
1864. 
 30. FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS 158–61 (1987); 
JOHN SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND 
CABINET 299 (1895). 
 31. David M. Gische, The New York City Banks and the Development of the National 
Banking System 1860-1870, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 21 (1979): 21–67; Richard S. Grossman, 
U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.Net Encyclopedia, (Mar 16, 2008), 
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 32. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 833 (1865).  
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Justice, affirmed the idea that the federal government possessed 
a broad national currency power over the country.33 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The greenbacks and national banks are not testaments to a 
unified northern or Republican economic vision and have a larger 
story than merely the wartime needs of 1861-1865. To the 
contrary, the origins of the Legal Tender Act and the National 
Banking Act defy any single Hamiltonian or Jacksonian origin. 
What unites these laws is an impulse in American politics to use 
national authority to reform the excesses of the unruly antebellum 
economy. Beardian-style economic conflict emerged after the war 
as the bifurcated greenback/national banking system fermented 
conflict between regions and classes. Yet what we often miss in 
these histories is the permanent transfer of power from a 
heterogeneous monetary system to a nation of federally created 
money. Various groups might argue over the medium of their 
money and the amount for the rest of the century but never the 
proposition that the federal government should control it. In this 
sense the Beards were right that some form of consensus 
motivated policy. Yet, that consensus created a powerful new 
state that could simultaneously restrict and promote the freedom 
of the market—depending on your interests. 
 
 33. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).  
 
